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Abstract 
Toshiyuki Ogihara 
University of Washington 
This article discusses the semantics of before, with special reference to so­
called non-factual before and its interaction with adverbs of quantification. I will 
adopt a version of Anscombe's  ( 1964) analysis of before and supplement it with a 
modal-temporal presupposition lexically induced by before. This account will be 
extended to quantificational cases as well within Rooth' s ( 1 985) theory of 
association with focus. Distinct interpretations associated with so-called factual 
and non-factual before -clauses are explained in terms of pragmatic 
presuppositions. 
1. Introduction 
An asymmetry between before and after has been noted by many 
researchers. Heinamaki ( 1 972, 1 974) presents some examples that clearly 
illustrate the difference. 
(1) a John died before he saw his grandchildren. 
b. Harry put money in the parking meter before a policeman gave him a 
ticket. 
( la) does not entail that John saw his grandchildren. On the contrary, we tend to 
infer from it that he did not. ( 1  b) makes the same point: its default reading is that 
Harry did not get a ticket because he put money in the parking meter. Although 
these inferences are context-dependent, one thing is clear: the truth of the entire 
sentence does not guarantee the truth of the before-clause it contains. Let us 
tentatively refer to the occurrences of before-clauses in ( la-b) on their default 
interpretations non-factual before-clauses. In this paper, I will use the term "non­
factual" to refer to a before-clause that is not entailed by the sentence in which it 
is embedded. !  It is prima facie justifiable to make a stronger claim here because 
( la) (or ( lb» appears to entail the negation of the before-clause that it contains. 
However, since I argue later that a pragmatic presupposition is responsible for this 
inference, I refrain from making a stronger claim here. When a before-clause 
appears to be entailed or presupposed by the sentence that contains it, I will refer 
to it as a factual before-clause. I will discuss alleged factual before-clauses below. 
By contrast, after behaves in a different way. Consider the following: 
(2) a John saw his grandchildren after he died. 
b. A policeman gave him a ticket after Harry put money in the parking 
meter. 
(2a) sounds contradictory. This is because it entails (and perhaps presupposes) the 
truth of the after-clause, which is impossible as we normally assume that two 
people can see each other only when they are both alive. (2b) also sounds odd, 
and we must imagine an unusual situation to make sense of it. One possible 
scenario is that Harry got a ticket because the policeman made an error. Assuming 
that both the main clause and the after-clause induce existential quantification 
over times, we can translate (2a) as in (3).2 
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3 t [ t<now 1\ John dies at t 1\ 3 t'[ t< t' <now 1\ John saw his grandchildren 
at t'll 
(3)  does not account for the meaning of (1 a), however. Intuitively, ( 1a) is true in a 
circumstance where John dies without having a chance to see his grandchildren. 
For example, John dies when his daughter, who is his only child, is pregnant with 
her fIrst child. 
Some instances of before-clauses are strongly biased toward either factual 
or non-factual readings. As mentioned above, the before-clauses in ( 1 a-b) are 
interpreted in normal circumstances as non-factual before-clauses. In fact, it is 
pragmatically impossible for each before-clause to be true if the main clause is 
true. On the other hand, example (4) due to Heinamiiki ( 1972) seems to entail the 
before-clause. 
(4) Sachi bought a Toyota before the price went up. 
If this observation is correct, (4) provides an instance of factual before . In other 
cases, the two distinct interpretations of the before-clause are readily available and 
are equally plausible. 
(5) John pushed the button before the fue started. 
When (5) is true, the before-clause can be either true or false depending upon the 
context. Suppose that pushing the button causes a fue to start. Then it seems to 
entail that the fIre did in fact start. On the other hand, it is possible to assume that 
pushing the button activates a mechanism that prevents a fIre. On this assumption, 
(5) seem to entail that the fue did not start. Thus, if the distinction between factual 
before and non-factual before is warranted, the distinction must be made in 
reference to before-clauses used in specifIc contexts. 
Another important difference between before and after is that bejore­
clauses, but not after-clauses, license negative polarity items (Heiniimiiki ( 1974), 
Landman ( 1991». 
(6) a John read the book before anyone else ever did. 
b. * John read the book after anyone else ever did. 
Any successful proposal must account for the above facts about before. 
Note also that this asymmetry between before and after is also found in 
other languages. For example, Japanese exhibits the following contrast between 
mae -ni 'before' and ato-de 'after' : 
(l) a Taroo-wa mago-no kao-o miru mae-ni sin-da. 
Taro-TOP grandchild-GEN face-ACC see-PRES before die-PAST 
'Taro died before he saw his grandchildren. '  
b. Taroo-wa sin-da ato-de mago-no kao-o mi-ta. 
Taro-lOP die-PAST after grandchild-GEN face-ACC see-PAST 
'Taro saw his grandchildren after he died.' 
(7a-b) are completely parallel to ( la) and (2a) , except that mae-ni-clauses 
(' before-clauses') in Japanese are always in the present tense (Ota 1973, Nakau 
1976, Ogihara 1 994).3 This fact shows that the asymmetry between before and 
after is not a language-specifIc fact and is relevant to general linguistic theory. 
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2. Anscombe's Analysis of Be/ore 
Anscombe ( 1964) presents an analysis of the semantics of before-clauses 
on the basis of the English data that involve factual before . Her argument is based 
upon stative sentences like the following: 
(8) a. The Parthenon was there before St. Peter' s was there. 
b. St. Peter's was there before the Parthenon was there. 
c. St. Peter' s was there after the Parthenon was there. 
d. The Parthenon was there after St. Peter's was there. 
Assume the history of the two buildings described by a diagram in (9). 
(9) ________________ Th�e�P�arth��e�n�o�n----------------:> 
______ �S�t�. Pwe�te�r�'s� ______ :> 
Anscombe observes that (8a) and (8b) cannot be both true, whereas (8c) and (8d) 
can be. For example, in (9), the Parthenon was erected earlier than St. Peter' s and 
was there after St. Peter' s was tom down. In this circumstance, (8a) and (8c-d) 
are true, but (8b) is false. In order to account for the difference between before 
and after attested by the examples in (8), Anscombe suggests as one possible 
analysis the following truth conditions for a past tense sentence that contains a 
before-clause:4 
(10) A sentence of the form p before q ,  where p and q are sentences in the past 
tense, is true iff the following condition holds: 3t [  t < now 1\ p' is true at t 
1\ 'if t'IT t  < now 1\ q' is true at 11 -7 t< t']], where p' and q' are tenseless 
forms of p and q, respectively. 
According to ( 10), (8a) is true iff there is a past time t such that the Parthenon 
exists at t and any past time t' at which St. Peter' s  exists follows t. The 
circumstance described in (9) verifies this condition. On the other hand, (8b) is 
false with respect to (9) because there is no time at which St. Peter' s exists and 
with respect to which the Parthenon's existence is wholly in the future. Thus, ( 10) 
successfully accounts for the difference between (8a) and (8b).5 This proposal is 
adopted in essentially the same form by Heinamaki ( 1 972) and by Landman 
( 199 1). 
( 10) has two advantages over (3). First, although ( 10) is not based upon 
non-factual before-examples, it accounts for them as well as for factual cases. 
According to ( 10), a sentence of the form p before q does not entail the before­
clause. It says: if there is a past time at which the before-clause is true, then it 
must be located after the main clause episode. This condition is satisfied by both 
factual before and non-factual before, if we disregard the possibility for the 
moment that repeatable events are involved. If a before-clause event occurs after a 
main-clause event, then (10) is satisfied. If there is no before-clause event, ( 10) is 
vacuously satisfied. 6 Thus the truth conditions given in ( 10) provide a unified 
account of before-clauses.7  
Second, as Landman ( 1991)  shows, ( 10) predicts that a before-clause is  a 
downward entailing context. This can be demonstrated by replacing a before­
clause with one that entails the before-clause. 
(1 1) a. Mary left. � Mary or Sue left. 
b. John left before Mary or Sue left. � John left before Mary left. 
Let the first sentence in ( l ib) be true. Then the formula given in ( 12) is true: 
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(12) 3 t [ t  < now /\ John leaves at t /\ 'r;f t'IT t' < now /\ Mary or Sue leaves at t'] 
- H < t' ]] 
Let to be a past time at which John leaves. Then the truth condition for the 
before-clause is satisfied iff { t  I t < now and Mary or Sue leaves at t }  k; { t  I 
to < t } .  Given the standard assumptions about the semantics of disjunction, the 
following condition holds: { t l t < now and Mary leaves at t }  k; { t i t  < now and 
Mary or Sue leaves at t } .  It is now clear that { t i t  < now and Mary leaves at t }  k; 
{ t l to < t } .  This means that the formula given in ( 13) is true. 
( 13) 3 t [  t < now /\ John leaves at t/\ 'r;f t'IT t' < now /\ Mary leaves at t'] -7 
t< t'l] 
Note that Anscombe's  semantics for before translates ( l Ib) as ( 1 3) .  This shows 
that a before-clause is a downward-entailing context, according to the truth 
conditions given in ( 10) .  This is also nice because as we saw above, negative 
polarity items can occur in before-clauses but not in after-clauses, and Ladusaw 
( 1 979) shows independently that negative polarity items can only occur in 
downward entailing contexts. 8 
Let me make one cautionary remark about Anscombe's  analysis. The 
difference between before and after cannot be established by using stative 
predicates in Japanese. Japanese does not permit stative before-clauses as in ( 14a­
b), whereas ( 14c), which has a stative main clause predicate, is perfectly 
acceptable. 
(14) a. * Taroo-wa kenkyuusitu-ni iru mae-ni, tenisu-o si -tao 
Taro-TOP office-at be-PRES before tennis-ACC do-PAST 
[intended] 'Taro played tennis before he was in his office.' 
b. * Taroo-wa kenkyuusitu-ni iru mae-ni, 
Taro-TOP office-at be-PRES before 
tenisu kooto-ni i-tao 
tennis court-at be-PAST 
[intended] 'Taro was on the tennis court before he was in his office. '  
C.  Taroo-wa tenisu-o sum mae-ni kenkyuusitu-ni i-tao 
Taro-TOP tennis-ACC do-PRES before office-at be-PAST 
'Taro was in his office before he played tennis. ' 
My native informant reports that the English gloss for ( 14a) sounds odd because 
the main clause has an event verb whereas the before-clause has a stative verb. In 
other words, English tends to prefer the main clause and the before-clause to be of 
the same Aktionsart ('action type') .  By contrast, the Japanese sentence in ( 14a) is 
ungrammatical simply because the before-clause has a stative predicate. This is 
shown by (14b), which has a stative predicate in both clauses. It is as anomalous 
as ( 1 4a) though its English gloss is perfectly acceptable. I have no good 
explanation for this difference between English and Japanese. Since Anscombe's  
analysis otherwise successfully accounts for the English and Japanese data, I 
assume for the purpose of this paper that Japanese has an independent and 
possibly language-specific syntactic constraint on types of verbs that can be used 
in specific constructions. 
I have shown above that Anscombe's analysis accounts for both factual 
and non-factual readings of before-clauses. What then is responsible for the 
perceived differences between these two types of interpretation? Let us now tum 
to Heiniimiiki (1972, 1974), who examines various examples that involve before 
(given below as ( 15a-e» and categorizes them as in ( 16). 
Non-Factual before and Adverbs of Quantification 
( 15) a. Sachi bought a Toyota before the price went up. (Factual ! )  
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
We had to install a new battery before the car started. (Factual 2) 
John died before he saw his grandchildren. (Non-factual 1 )  
John died two months before he would have retired. (Non-factual 2) 
I left the country before anything happened. (Non-committal) 
Two comments are in order here. First, Heinlimiiki notices that in some cases the 
speaker does not commit himself to the truth or falsity of a before-clause, as in 
( ISd). She uses the term "non-factual before" to designate a before-clause that is 
perceived to be false and reserves the term "non-committal" for cases where the 
truth value of the before-clause is left open. Second, non-factual before (in 
Heinlimiiki's terms) requires that there be a causal connection between the main 
clause event and the negation of the before-clause event. This seems to show that 
a before-clause describes an event that is assumed to obtain unless something 
prevents its occurrence. Let us discuss these two points in more detail. 
(16) Characteristic Type of before-clause 
factual non-factual non-committal 
1 2 1 2 
1 .  before-clause is true yes 
2. takes modifiers such as yes 
just, right, and temporal 
measure phrases 
3. causal relation between no 
the clauses 
a. main clause prevents 
the before-clause 
b. main clause makes 
the before-clause possible 
yes 
no 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
not known 
no 
no 
yes 
Consider ( 17), which is another example of non-committal before (in 
Heinlimiiki's  terms). 
( 17) John attended a party held at Bill 's house. Bill drank a lot and looked as if 
he was going to get drunk. Since John hates to deal with drunkards, he left 
before Bill got drunk. 
The italicized sentence in ( 17) leaves open whether Bill actually got drunk after 
John left. If we assume that John's leaving has nothing to do with whether Bill 
actually gets drunk later, the two possible outcomes do not seem to require two 
different interpretations of the sentence. Seen from John's perspective, what he 
did was to leave while Bill was still not drunk. This type of paraphrase is quite 
natural and common in Japanese. 
( 18) a. Zyon-wa Biru-ga yopparau mae ni kaet-ta. 
John-TOP Bill-NOM get-drunk before at leave-PAST 
'John left before Bill got drunk. ' 
b. Zyon-wa Biru-ga yopparawa-nai uti-ni kaet-ta. 
John-TOP Bill-NOM get-drunk-NEG while-at leave-PAST 
[Lit.] 'John left while Bill does not get drunk.'9 
( I8a) and ( I8b) convey approximately the same information, and the latter shows 
clearly that the temporal information conveyed is that of Bill 's leaving at a time 
when the before-clause event has not (yet) obtained. Something similar is possible 
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in English. The last sentence in the discourse given in ( 17) can be paraphrased as 
in ( 1 9), which conveys approximately the same information as the Japanese 
example given in ( i 8b). 
( 19) John left while Bill was still not drunk. 
I take the semantic equivalence between ( 18a) and ( 18b) (or between the italicized 
sentence in ( 1 7) and ( 19)) to be an important piece of evidence for Anscombe' s  
analysis of  before-clauses because the translation of ( 18a) based upon ( 10) can be 
converted into a formula that is intuitively the right translation for ( I8b). 
(20) 3t[t < now /\ p'is true at t /\ \7't' [[t' < now /\ q' is true at t' ] � t < t' ]] 
3t[t < now /\ p' is true at t /\ \7't' [...,[t' < now /\ q' is true at t' ] v t < t' ]] 
[conditional law] 
3t[t < now /\ p' is true at t /\ \7't' ...,[[t' < now /\ q' is true at t' ] /\ ...,[t < t'm 
[de Morgan's law] 
3t[t < now /\ p' is true at t /\ -,3t' [[t' < now /\ q'is true at t' ] /\ ...,[t < t' ]]] 
[law of quantifier negation] 
3t[t < now /\ p'is true at t /\ -,3t' [[t' < now /\ q' is true at t' ] /\ t' � t]] 
[conversion due to an obvious semantic relation between '<' and '�' ] 
The fact that the above intuitively correct semantic equivalence is supported by a 
logical equivalence shows that Anscombe' s  analysis is on the right track. 
This paraphrase also provides an answer to a conceptual puzzle associated 
with Anscombe's  proposal: why is it that before manages to convey a universal 
quantifier meaning? The paraphrase given in (20) shows clearly that the meaning 
of before q should be taken as the negation of after or when q. Let us assume that 
a past tense sentence of the form p TC q, where TC is a temporal connective 
(before , after or when), is used when the hearer wants to know when a p event 
obtained in relation to a q event, which was likely to occur within the reference 
time. The focus of attention is whether a q event had already obtained (indicated 
by after), was obtaining (indicated by when), or had not (yet) obtained (indicated 
by before) when a p  event occurred. In other words, the deictic center is the time 
of the p event. On this analysis, before is used to deny the existence of an earlier 
q-event or a concurrent q event in relation to the main clause event. My claim 
then is that before indicates the "complement" of the possibilities suggested by 
after or when. Note that (2 1 a) translates as (22a), according to the above 
paraphrase, whereas (21b) translates as (22b). It is clear that (22a) is semantically 
equivalent to (22b). 
(21)  a. 
b. 
(22) a 
b. 
John left before Mary got drunk. 
It was not after Mary got drunk or when she got drunk that John left. 
3t[t < now /\ John leaves at t /\ -,3t' [t' � t /\ Mary gets drunk at t' l] 
3t[t < now /\ John leaves at t /\ -,3t' [t' < t /\ Mary gets drunk at t' ] 
/\ ...,[Mary gets drunk at t]] 
Additional evidence for a unified approach to before-clauses comes from 
Spanish (Antxon Olarrea, personal communication). Both factual and non-factual 
before clauses are rendered as Spanish sentences in the subjunctive, rather than in 
the indicative, and there is no overt morphological marker that distinguishes 
between the two types of before . 
Non-Factual before and Adverbs of Quantification 
(23) a Juan muri6 antes de que (el) viera I *vio 
John died before he saw [SUBJ] / saw [JND] 
a sus nietos. 
his-grandchildren 
'John died before he saw his grandchildren. '  
b .  Marfa compro un Toyota 
Mary bought a Toyota 
antes de que subieran I *subieron los precios. 
before went-up [SUBJ] / went-up [JND] the-prices 
'Mary bought a Toyota before the prices went up. '  
Infinitival verb forms can be used when the subject of the before-clause is  the 
same as that of the main clause, but they do not distinguish between factual before 
and non-factual before , either. 
The examples that we have looked at suggest that Anscombe' s analysis 
given in ( 10) is on the right track and applies to all attested examples of before­
clauses. The distinct interpretations of before-clauses can be accounted for in 
terms of presuppositions. For example, if the main clause event is assumed to 
prevent the before-clause event from taking place as in ( 1a) (= ( 1 5c» , it is natural 
to infer that no before-clause event obtained. If the main clause is assumed to 
enable the before-clause to be true as in ( 1 5b), then it is perceived to be a case of 
factual before . In Section 5, I will discuss in more detail how to incorporate such 
presuppositions in my system. 
3. Issues 
The discussion up to here suggests that ( 10) is the one we need for the 
truth conditions for sentences that involve a before-clause, regardless of its type. 
However, some supplementary tools are needed to account for additional readings 
associated with before-clauses. For example, (10) does not explain why a before­
clause cannot depict an episode that could not possibly have occurred. 
(24) The Namibian boy died of starvation before he became the president of the 
United States. 
If it is in fact the case that the Namibian boy died of starvation, then ( 10) predicts 
that (24) is true, and it does not explain why (24) sounds very odd. Intuitively, the 
before-clause must depict a situation that could have occurred around the time of 
the main clause event, and (24) fails in this respect (partly) because the Namibian 
boy would never have been able to become president of the United States because 
only U.S.-born individuals can become president. Needless to say, we are not 
talking about an absolute possibility here because the relevant clause in the 
Constitution could be changed, but the point is that when the before-clause is 
extremely unlikely to be true, the entire sentence tends to be anomalous. This is 
true of Japanese, too. 
It is not enough for the event described by a before-clause to be a probable 
event. A before-clause must describe something that was likely to obtain in the 
near future relative to the main clause event. This point is established by examples 
like (25). 
(25) The five-year-old girl died before she saw her grandchildren. 
Suppose that her grandchildren refers to the girl's biological grandchildren. Then 
although the truth conditions given in ( 10) are satisfied and the girl could have 
seen her grandchildren had the girl been alive, (25) still sounds very odd. The 
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reason seems to be that even if the girl had not died, it would have been some fifty 
years later that she became a grandmother. Thus, although it would have been 
likely that there would be a time at which the before-clause was true, such a time 
would have been much later than the main clause event. Thus, (25) sounds very 
strange as a result. The same point could be made with (24) as well. 
This problem is closely related to the one suggested by the following 
example: 
(26) John went to sleep before he washed his face. 
Suppose that John went to bed, had seven hours of sleep, got up, and washed his 
face. In this situation, ( 10) predicts that (26) is true. Howevel', (26) sounds odd, if 
not completely unacceptable. Stump ( 1985) notices this problem and guarantees 
the temporal proximity of the main clause event and the before-clause event by 
positing a pragmatically defined temporal relation, but he only discusses factual 
before examples there. Since ( 10) does not guarantee that there is an actual event 
described by the before-clause, it is technically impossible to specify the temporal 
distance between the time of the matrix and the time of the before-clause when the 
before-clause is never true. Examples like (24) through (26) support the idea that a 
before-clause must describe an event that is very likely to occur around the time 
of the matrix clause event. I will incorporate this important observation into my 
proposal, keeping in mind the insight of Anscombe's  analysis. 
Another problem with Anscombe' s  original proposal is associated with 
repeated occurrences of the same type of event. Anscombe herself is aware of this 
problem. For example, in (27) her proposal given above as ( 10) works .only if 
there is no before-clause event earlier than the time at which the main clause is 
true. 
(27) John called Mary before he visited her. 
However, this prediction does not match our intuitions. (27) could be true even if 
John visited Mary many times in the past and on the first occasion he visited her 
without calling her in advance. On this scenario, ( 10) predicts that (27) is never 
true because there is no phone call event that precedes every visiting event. 
Intuitively the source of the problem is clear. In general, a tensed sentence must 
be evaluated with respect to a contextually salient interval, which is often referred 
to as a reference time, following Reichenbach ( 1947) . I revise ( 10) as in (28) by 
incorporating this aspect of tense meaning. 
(28) A sentence of the form p before q ,  where p and q are sentences in the past 
tense, is true iff the following condition holds: 3t[ t < now /\ t � t R /\ 
p' is true at t /\ \7't'[[t' < now /\ t' � tR /\ q' is true at t' ] -7 t < t' ]] where p' 
and q' are tenseless forms of p and q, respectively. t R is an indexical that 
denotes a contextually salient interval. 
This is a modification in the right direction. (28) guarantees that when we say that 
a main clause event occurs at a time after which every before-clause event occurs, 
we only pay attention to a restricted interval. In addition, non-factual cases show 
that the occurrence of a before-clause event must be highly likely throughout the 
reference time in question. Thus, we could incorporate this information into the 
truth conditions along the following lines: 
Non-Factual before and Adverbs of Quantification 
(29) P before q is true iff 3t[t < now / d !; tR AP' is true at t A '1]'([( < now A 
( � tR /\ if is true at (] -H < (]] is true, where t R denotes the contextually 
salient past interval during which the occurrence of a q' -type event is very 
likely. 
I believe this is essentially the right approach to the semantics of (both factual and 
non-factual) before-clauses. The requirement that tR receive as its value an 
interval during which an occurrence of q' -type event is likely should be 
understood as a presupposition, rather than an assertion made by a before-clause. 
To simplify the treatment of presuppositions, however, I will incorporate it into 
the translation of before in the following account. Our next task is to make precise 
the notion of "likely occurrences of some event." Since this clearly involves 
modal concepts, I will propose a modal-temporal analysis of before-clauses. The 
idea represented in (29) can be restated in formal terms as in (30). 
(30) A sentence of the form p before q ,  where p and q are sentences in the past 
tense, is true in Wo at the speech time s * with respect to some context c9 
iff there is a time t1 < s * located within the reference time t R at which p 
is true in Wo and there is a time t2 that abuts t R and in every world 
W E  Inr« wo , t2 » ,  there is a time t3 c tR such that q' is true in w at t3 , 
and every time t4 c tR at which q' is true in Wo is located after t1 ' [N.B. 
For some technical reasons to be made explicit later, the proper-subset 
symbol 'c ' is used to indicate a non-initial subinterval in this paper. For 
example, t1 c t2 indicates that tl is a non-initial subinterval of t2 ' 
Definition: t1 c t2 iff t1 � t2 and there is a time t such that t � t2 and 
t < tl .] 
Inr is a function from W x T into P(W) (i.e., the power set of the set of worlds) 
and is introduced by Dowty ( 1979: 148-150) to account for the semantics of the 
progressive. Intuitively, for any world w and any interval t, Inr « w,t» is the set 
of worlds which are exactly like w up to and including t and in which the future 
course of events after this time develops in ways most compatible with the past 
course of events. (30) says that the main clause is true at a time within the 
contextually determined reference time tR, and q' is very likely to occur within tR' 
Moreover, p' occurs within tR before any occurrence of q' within tR' This proposal 
takes care of both factual and non-factual before-clauses. 
In the following discussion, I will employ a logical language in which 
temporal terms appear as arguments of various predicates. I will show in (33) how 
a sentence of the form p before q translates into IL compositionally, with the help 
of binary operator DEFAULT as defined in (3 1 )  and temporal relation 'abut' as 
defmed in (32). Informally, DEFAULT(kXt) reads "there is a time within t at which 
k obtains by default." I follow Dowty ( 1979) and use i to designate the type for 
intervals. I will use the symbol "s*" to indicate the speech time in the following 
translations. 
(31) DEFAULT is an expression of type « i,t>,<i,t» such that for any world 
wo , context c ,  interval to , and characteristic function k of a set of times, 
[DEFAULT�.c (kXto) is true iff there is a time tl that abuts to such that in 
every w E Inr« wo, tl » ,  there is some time t c to such that k(t) = 1 .  
(32) For any intervals tl and t2 , tl abuts t2 iff tl U t2 is an interval and tl < t2 ' 
28 1 
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Syntax: [p[before q]] (where p and q are past tense sentences) is analyzed 
as PAST [p' [before q'] 10 
Translation: 
1 .  before => ItQtltPtltt3t2 [t2 < t 1\ t2 C tR A Pt (t2 ) A DEFAULT (Qt )(tR ) A 
'v'tl [Qt(tl ) � t2 < tt l] 
2. q' => Itt[q' (t)] 
3. p' => Itt[p' (t)] 
4. before q' => ItPtltt3t2 [t2 < t A t2 c tR A Pt (t2 ) A DEFAULT (q' )(tR ) A 
'v'tM' (tl ) � t2 < tt l] 
5. p' before q' => Itt3t2 [t2 < t A t2 C tR A p' (t2 )  ADEFAULT (q' )(tR ) A 
'v'tl [q' (t) ) � t2 < tt l] 
6. PAST [p' [before q']] => 3t2 [t2 < s * At2 c tR A p'(t2 ) A  
DEFAULT (q' )(tR )  A 'v'tl [q' (tl ) � t2 < tt l] 
Here, p' and q' are temporal abstracts that denote the relevant sets of times. p' (t) 
reads 'p' is true at t' . As mentioned above, the clause DEFAULT(kXtR) is officially 
a presupposition associated with any before-clause. At this point, let us examine 
whether my proposal predicts that a before-clause is a downward-entailing 
context. Let us reconsider (34a-b) (presented earlier as ( l lb)) and see if (34a) 
entails (34b). 
(34) a. 
b. 
John left before Mary or Sue left. 
John left before Mary left. 
The two sentences given in (34a-b) translate as in (35a-b), respectively, 
according to my proposal. 
(35) a 3t2 [t2 < s * A l2 c. til A John leaves at t2 A DEFAULT (Itt[Mary or Sue leaves at t]X tR) A ''lA [Mary or Sue leaves at t) � t2 < tt l] 
b. 3t2 [t2 < s *  I\ t2 c tR A John leaves at t2 ADEFAULT 
(ltt[Mary leaves at t]) ( t R) A'v' tl [Mary leaves at tl � t2 < tl ]] 
I assume that the same reference time is used for the evaluation of the two 
sentences, which is a natural assumption. This is because the entailment relation 
can only make sense when they are used in the same context, and, therefore, the 
reference time is also the same interval. Moreover, this interval must be one 
during which Sue's leaving as well as Mary's leaving are very likely. For 
example, we can think of the time of a party where both Mary and Sue are 
present. Thus, for (34a) and (34b) to be comparable, the same presupposition must 
be shared by them. This means that the sub-formulas that involve DEFAULT in 
(35a-b) must be true before we can begin to compare the two sentences. On these 
assumptions, we can say that my proposal preserves one of the virtues of 
Anscombe' s  analysis, namely that a before-clause is a downward-entailing 
context. 
4. Before and Adverbs of Quantification 
Let us now tum to sentences that involve both a before-clause and an 
adverb of quantification. For the sake of exposition, let us start with relatively 
simple examples and try to account for them on the assumption that a before­
clause is entailed by the entire sentence in which it is embedded. Partee 
( 1984:273) considers example (36a) and shows that its rendition given in (36b) 
incorrectly predicts that John lights up a cigarette at all times before each phone 
call. However, if we adopted (36c) instead, we would also predict incorrectly that 
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one event of John' s lighting up a cigarette that precedes all of John's phone calls 
would be sufficient to make (36a) true. 
(36) a 
b. 
c. 
Before John makes a phone call, he always lights up a cigarette. 
\it'v't' [[t' < t 1\ John makes a phone call at t] � John lights up a 
cigarette at (] 
\it[John makes a phone call at t � 3t' [t' < t 1\ John lights up a 
cigarette at t' ]] 
The problem is avoided if we assume that always quantifies over a preselected set 
of non-overlapping intervals. This is based upon our intuition that when we use 
always, we think of all the relevant situations that fit some description and are 
disjoint from one another. I simply assume that in the case of temporal examples, 
the domain of quantification for an adverb of quantification is a set of mutually 
disjoint intervals. Let us use Ie to refer to the set of contextually determined 
intervals for context c and defme it as in (37). 
(37) For any context c, the domain of quantification for an adverb of temporal 
quantification is a set of intervals Ie such that for any t, t' E Ie , t  n t' = 0 
Following (37), (36a) is analyzed as follows: 
(38) \it\it"[t E Ie 1\ t" c t 1\ John makes a phone call at t" � 3t' [t' < t" 
1\ t' c t 1\ John lights up a cigarette at t' ]] 
Since the set of intervals Ie only contains non-overlapping intervals, and since for 
each case the two relevant events must be located within the given time frame, 
both of the problems presented above are corrected here. 
However, the analysis given in (38) is not valid for non-factual before­
clauses. Thus, we must modify it to accommodate them. The non-factual nature of 
before-clauses is preserved even when an adverb of quantification is superim­
posed on the structure. Consider the following example: 
(39) John was unhappy and there were many times in his life that he had 
thought about killing himself. But his wife always came to his rescue 
before he jumped out of the window. 
For the obvious reason, the situations that we must consider are those in which 
John was suicidal, not those in which John actually killed himself. (39) says that 
for each such occasion, his wife's coming to his rescue prevented him from 
committing suicide. I believe that (40) accurately describes the truth conditions 
for sentences of the form always p, before q .  
(40) always p, before q (where p and q are past tense sentences) is true in Wo at 
s * in c iff { t  I t < S * and t E Ie and DEFAULT(q'Xt) is true in Wo }k:{ t 
I t  < S * such that t E Ie and there is a time t3 c t such that p' is true at t3 
and every t4 k: t at which q' is true is located after t3 } 
Now the question is how to arrive at (40) compositionally. Stump (1985) proposes 
a theory in which an adverb of quantification takes as its two arguments the 
translations of the adverbial clause and the main clause, which are temporal 
abstracts. Consider (41) for example. 
(41) John was always asleep when Mary called him. 
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(41 )  is symbolized as in (42). 
(42) ALWAYS (At[Mary calls John at t])(At[John is asleep at tD 
Roughly speaking, always p, when q is true iff { t  I t/ is true at t} !: {t' I p' is true at 
( } ,  abstracting away from the semantic contribution of the tense morphemes. 
However, if the compositional analysis of before given in (33) is correct, (40) 
cannot be derived in the same way. The reason is that the "nuclear scope" of 
always given above in the form of a set of intervals (i.e., { t  I t < S * such that t E Ie 
and there is a time t3 c t such that pi is true at t3 and every t4 !: t at which q' is 
true is located after t3 } )  makes reference to the times at which the before-clause is 
true (as well as to the times at which the main clause is true). Thus, we cannot 
simply take the translation of the before-clause and the translation of the main 
clause and state the relation between these two sets. 
One possible alternative is to look for the source of the domain of 
quantification for quantificational adverbs elsewhere. This idea seems plausible 
when we consider examples like the following: 
(43) When I go to my office, I always drink coffee before I start doing 
anything. 
The truth conditions of (43) can be described as follows: 
(44) { t  I t E Ie and I am in my office at t }!:{ t I t E Ie and there is a time t'c t at  
which I drink coffee and every time t" c t at which I do anything is 
located after t' } 
According to this analysis, the set of times at which the when-clause is true serves 
as the domain of quantification (or "restrictor") for always, and the set of times at 
which the rest of the sentence (including the before-clause) is true serves as the 
"nuclear scope." 1 1 The problem with this proposal is that it requires the existence 
of an overt when-clause, which is often missing. 
Setting aside the problem of compositionality, we notice one interesting 
prediction that (40) makes. Consider (43). (40) predicts that if the speaker goes to 
his office ten times, it is acceptable for him to do something after drinking coffee 
in seven of the ten visits and not to do anything after drinking coffee in the three 
others. Although the judgments are subtle, this prediction is also borne out by an 
example like (45), which is a quantified version of ( 17). 
(45) Whenever John attended a party held at Bill' s  house, Bill drank a lot and 
looked as if he was going to get drunk. Since John hates to deal with 
drunkards, he always left before Bill got drunk. 
(45) allows the possibility that in some cases Bill actually got drunk and in other 
cases he did not. This is precisely what (40) predicts. My informant says that (45) 
is only marginally acceptable on this interpretation, and this reading is more 
readily available when the entire discourse is in the present tense. I do not have a 
good explanation for this observation. The following Japanese sentence is 
perfectly acceptable and leaves open whether or not Hanako got drunk on each 
occasion: 
(46) Taroo-wa itumo Hanako-ga you mae-ni kaet-ta. 
Taro-TOP always Hanako-NOM get-drunk-PRES before leave-PAST 
'Taro always left before Hanako got drunk. ' 
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The following English sentences are better examples of non-committal before, 
according to my informant: 
(47) a I used to go to my office every day. But when I got there, I always 
fell asleep before I started doing anything. 
b. I was often in the parts of the world that were politically unstable. I 
always left the country before any riot occurred. 
(47a) allows the possibility that I fell asleep in my office and ended up doing 
nothing on some occasions. (4Th) makes the same point. The sentence is true even 
if in some situations no riot occurred after the speaker left the country. Thus, the 
truth conditions given in (40) receive empirical support. This once again confirms 
my claim that the interpretation of before due to Anscombe captures the assertion 
made by any before-clause. 
Turning to usutilly , we notice an interesting point with regard to (48a-b). 
(48) a The object of the game was to prevent the invaders from reaching the 
player's territory. Since John was a good player, he usually 
succeeded in destroying the invaders before they reached his 
territory. 
b. John often borrowed books from the university library. He usually 
returned them before he was fmed. 
Intuitively, (48a) is true iff in most of the situations in which the invaders were 
approaching his territory, he destroyed them, thereby preventing them from 
reaching it. But in a small number of cases, he failed to destroy them, and they did 
reach his territory. Thus, this default interpretation of (48a) shows that the before­
clause describes factual events and non-factual events at the same time. What this 
tells us conclusively is that Anscombe' s  analysis is correct. By leaving open 
whether the before-clause is true or not for each case, we can make the right 
predictions about the truth conditions for (48a). (48b) makes the same point. Let 
me provide the following truth conditions for sentences involving usually and 
before : 
(49) Usually p. before q (where p and q are sentences in the past tense) is true 
in Wo at s* in c iff for most tl such that tl < s*, t1 E lcand 
[DEFAULT(q')Dg,c( t1 ) = 1 ,  there is a time t2 c tl at which p' is true and 
every time t3 c tl at which q is true is located after t2 . 
On its default reading, (48a) pragmatically presupposes that destroying invaders 
generally prevent them from reaching the player' s territory. In most cases, John 
destroys the invaders, and this pragmatically entails that they do not reach John's 
territory. In the small number of cases where John fails to do so, we infer that the 
invaders do reach John's territory because this is the default outcome and, 
moreover, the player is the only person who can prevent this consequence in a 
game situation. This is p.redicted from the above truth conditions combined with 
the assumed pragmatic presupposition. 
In order to deal with quantificational examples in a natural way, I adopt 
Rooth' s  ( 1985) domain selection theory. 12 Rooth discusses how adverbs of 
quantification interact with when-clauses. According to this theory, unlike 
Stump's  ( 1985) theory, the restrictive clause for always does not come directly 
from the content of the temporal adverbial clause such as a before-clause. Rather 
the relevant information is derived from the focus structure of the entire sentence. 
Although the treatment of before-clauses is more complicated than when-clauses, 
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Rooth ' s  proposal about adverbs of quantification can be extended 
straightforwardly to before cases. On the basis of (40). the truth conditions for 
sentences that involve a before-clause and always (as an instance of an adverb of 
quantification) are stated schematically as follows: 
(50) always p before q is true in Wo at the speech time s* in c iff 
[ALWAYS (Pt)(.A.t[t E Ie 1\ t < S * I\DEFAULT (q' )(t) 1\ 3t2 [t2 e t 1\ p' F (t2 ) 1\ 
'v't3 [[q' (t3 ) A t3 e t] -H2 < t3 ]]] )Dwo,e = 1 . For any kl . k2E D<i,t>. 
[ALWAys JI(k1 Xk2) = 1 iff { t l kl (t) = I }  � { t lk2(t) = I } . ( Da for any type a 
is the set of all possible denotations of type a. ALWAYS is a constant of 
type « i .t>.« i.t>. t» .) 
Pt in (50) is a free variable for sets of times. Assuming that the main clause is 
focused. the "domain of quantification" for always in (50) is obtained from the 
translation of the non-quantified sentence given in (33) via the following 
computation (Rooth 1985 : 173): 
(5 1) a. { k[ t E Ie A t  < S * I\DEFAULT (q' )(t) 1\ 3t2 [t2 e t 1\ r(t2 ) 1\ 'v't3 [[q' (t3 ) 
I\ t3 e t] -H2 < t3 ]]] l r  E D<i t> } (where s *  denotes the speech time) 
b U {A.t[t E Ie 1\ t < S * 1\ DEFAULT (q' )(t) 1\ 3t2 [t2 e t 1\ r(t2 ) 1\ 
'v't3 [[q' (t3 ) 1\  t3 e t] -H2 < t3 ]]]l r E D<i,t> } 
(5 1a) represents the p-set of any sentence of the form PF before q .  where the 
subscripted F indicates a focused constituent. In order to derive the set of times 
that is appropriate for restricting the domain of quantification for always. the 
union operation on this p-set is required as described in (5 1b). I follow the 
strategy adopted by Rooth to arrive at the result of this operation. If we posit a 
constant of type <i.t> (c l ,<i,I» that denotes the set of all times. (52) denotes a 
member of the family of sets given in (5 1a) .  
(52) A.t[t E Ie 1\ t < S * 1\ DEFAULT (q' )(t) 1\ 3t2 [t2 e t 1\ cl <i t> (t2 ) 
1\ 'v't3[[q' (t3 ) A t3 e t] -H2 < t3 ]]] 
, , 
Since c l .<i,t> (t2) is true for any value of t2. the denotation of (52) is the most 
inclusive set and is equivalent to (5 1b).  Moreover. (53a) is guaranteed to be true 
for any value of t because t3et reads 't3 is a non-initial subinterval of t '  and. 
therefore. there is always some time earlier than t3 and is part of t .' 13 Thus. (52) is 
semantically equivalent to (53b). 
(53) a. 3t2 [t2 e t 1\ cl .<i t> (t2 ) 1\ 'v't3 [[q' (t3 ) A t3 e t] -H2 < t3 ] ] 
b. A.t[t E Ie 1\ t < s *' I\DEFAULT(q'Xt)] 
Thus. the truth conditions for sentences of the form always p, before q are given 
as (54a). which is reduced to (54b) after removing the redundant materials in the 
"nuclear scope" of always . 
(54) a. 
b. 
ALWAYS ( A,t[t E Ie A t  < s * 1\ DEFAULT (q' )(t)]X A.t[t E Ie 1\ t < S * 1\ 
DEFAULT (q' )(t) 1\ 3t2 [t2 e t 1\ p' F (t2) 
1\ 'v't3[[q' (t�) 1\ t3 e t] � t2 < t3 ]]] 
ALWAYS ( M[t E Ie 1\ t < S * 1\ DEFAULT (q' )(t)])(A,t[t E Ie 1\ 
3t2 [t2 e t 1\ p' F (t2 ) 1\ 'v't3 [[q' (t3 )  A t3 e t] � t2 < t3 ]]]) 
(54b) says "every contextually defined past interval within which q' occurs as a 
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default is a time within which pi occurs before q' does." This accords with the 
native speaker' s intuitions about English sentences that involve before-clauses. 
5. Distinct Readings of Before -Clauses and Pragmatic Presuppositions 
My general proposal about the semantics of before is that a unified 
account based upon Anscombe' s  proposal is possible. This is similar to 
Heinlimiiki's  ( 1 972, 1974) position. In order to defend this position, we must 
assume that pragmatic presuppositions are responsible for a variety of 
interpretations associated with before-clauses. At this point, let me make clear my 
theoretical position with regard to presuppositions and look at some important 
data from this perspective. I assume with Stalnaker ( 1972, 1974, 1978) that a 
proposition is presupposed iff it is entailed by the "context set," which is a set of 
possible worlds. 14 
First, before requires the reference time to be an interval during which a 
before-clause event is likely to obtain. As mentioned above, I take this to be a 
presuppositional meaning generally associated with before . . 
Second, causal relations between main clause events and before-clause 
events affect the interpretation of before-clauses. Let us reconsider (5Sa) (cited 
earlier as (S)), which receives two distinct interpretations depending upon the 
relation between the before-clause and the main clause. 
(S5) a. John pushed the button before the fire started. 
b. The button is pushed. => A fire starts. 
c. The button is pushed. => A fire is prevented. 
Assume that (S5b) and (SSc) are interpreted in terms of Lewis' s  ( 1973) proposal 
for counterfactual conditionals. Suppose that (S5a) is uttered in two different 
contexts. In context c" (55b) is part of the common ground, whereas in context C2, 
(SSc) is part of the common ground. In both contexts, the reference time must be 
an interval during which the fire is likely to start. In context c) , the hearer infers 
from (55a) that the fire actually started. On the other hand, in context C2,  it is 
assumed that the fire was prevented due to the presupposition given in (S5c). This 
explains the different inferences in the two cases. This account extends 
straightforwardly to quantificational examples. For example, (S6) allows the same 
type of ambiguity. 
(56) John always pushed the button before the fire started. 
Note that (5S) is not vague in the way that (47a-b) are. Once the context is fixed, 
the interpretation is either that the fire started on all occasions' or that the fire was 
prevented on all occasions. This is exactly what my system predicts. 
What if there is no causal connection between the two clauses in question? 
Because of the way the semantics of before-clauses is defined (see (S4)), it is 
expected that there is a before-clause event within the reference time. However, 
there is no guarantee that this would happen because it is always possible that an 
independent event not described by the main clause prevents the occurrence of a 
before-clause event. This reasoning leads to the right interpretation of (57), cited 
earlier as ( lSe). 
(57) I left the country before anything happened. 
Assume that the speaker was just a powerless foreigner and had no influence on 
whatever was about to take place. Thus, his leaving did not directly cause any 
important events there. Pragmatic presuppositions hence do not provide 
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information as to whether anything happened after the speaker left, leaving the 
impression that the truth value of the before-clause is undetermined. 
Other pragmatic presuppositions influence the ways in which before­
clauses are interpreted. For example, in (58), the before-clause is clearly part of 
the common ground. 
(58) John did help Mary in the end. But he made it clear that he was doing her 
a big favor before he did so. 
Similarly, it is possible that the negation of the before-clause is part of the 
common ground as in (59). 
(59) John did not commit suicide. His wife came to his rescue before he 
jumped out of the window. 
The truth of John did not commit suicide is compatible with the truth conditions 
of the second sentence in (59), and this is responsible for the impression that the 
negation of the before-clause is entailed by the entire sentence. 
Finally, let me make a brief remark on preposed before-clauses. Knud 
Lambrecht (personal communication) points out that preposed before-clauses are 
always factual. Unlike (55), (60) is not ambiguous. 
(60) Before the fIre started, John pushed the button. 
In Japanese, mae-ni-clauses are always preposed, but topicalized mae-ni-clauses 
behave like preposed before-clauses in En/lish in that they are necessarily factual. 
Note that (61 )  is anomalous (cf. (7a)). 15, 1 
(61) # Taroo-wa Mago-no kao-o miru mae-ni-wa sin-da. 
Taro-TOP grandchildren-GEN face-ACC see-PRES before-TOP die-PAST 
[Intended] 'Taro died before he saw his grandchildren. ' 
As far as I can see, the status of (61 )  is very similar to that of English sentence 
(62), which involves a preposed before-clause. 
(62) # Before John saw his grandchildren, he died. 
I contend that the above facts are accounted for if we assume that preposed 
before-clauses in English and topicalized m a e-ni-clauses in Japanese are 
presupposed. This is no explanation, but it is a plausible assumption because 
topicalized constituents are often claimed to convey "old information" (e.g., Kuno 
1973), which is clearly related to the notion of pragmatic presupposition. The 
similarity between (6 1 )  and (62) is striking enough for us to assume that 
preposing a before-clause and topicalizing a mae-ni-clause have the same 
semantic effect. Thus, I argue that preposed before-clauses in English and 
topicalized mae-n i-clauses in Japanese carry with them an existential 
presupposition. 
(63) Existential Presupposition of Preposed before: 
before q, p (or q-mae-ni-wa, p in Japanese) presupposes 3t[t � tR /\ q' (t)] 
Since a sentence of the form before q asserts that no before-clause event obtains 
before the main clause event, we can conclude that a before-clause event obtains 
after the main clause event. 
Non-Factual before and Adverbs of Quantification 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I have discussed the interaction between non-factual before 
and adverbs of quantification. My analysis of before is based upon Anscombe' s  
( 1964) and i s  supplemented by some auxiliary proposals. First, a modal-temporal 
analysis of the pragmatic presupposition associated with before specifies the 
relevant interval within which the occurrence of a main clause event is likely. 
Second, the interaction between before and adverbs of quantification is explained 
in terms of Rooth' s domain selection theory. Third, the distinct interpretations 
associated with factual and non-factual before-clauses are attributed to pragmatic 
presuppositions. Our next task will be to provide a formal treatment of discourse 
presuppositions and their interactions with various interpretations of before­
clauses, but this would require another paper. 
Endnotes 
• I thank Sharon Hargus, Heles Contreras, Craige Roberts, Henriette de Swart, 
Bill Ladusaw, Michael Johnston, Giulia Centineo, Chris Kennedy, Arnim von 
Stechow, Greg Carlson, David Dowty, Lee Baker, Ray Jackendoff, Friederike 
Moltmann, Knud Lambrecht, Margaret Campos, Ikumi Imani, Heles Contreras, 
Antxon Olarrea, and participants of SALTS for discussions, suggestions ,  
examples, native intuitions, etc. regarding the material presented here. I apologize 
for those who are inadvertently omitted. I alone am responsible for any errors. 
1 Heinamaki ( 1974) uses the term "non-committal" for this type of reading, 
whereas Sanchez-Valencia et al. ( 1994) employ the term "non-veridical." 
2 Strictly speaking, the temporal locations of the events in (3) must be constrained 
by contextually supplied reference times. This point will be discussed in Section 
3. See Ogihara (in press) for details. 
3 Ogihara ( 1994) presents a sequence-of-tense analysis of tense morphemes in 
Japanese and English temporal adverbial clauses, assuming that they are factual 
clauses. 
4 Anscombe ( 1964: 10- 1 1 )  herself makes a negative remark on this proposal, 
which involves quantification over times. However, since the basic idea originates 
in Anscombe' s  work, I will refer to it as Anscombe's  proposal in the rest of the 
paper. 
S This account tacitly assumes that stative sentences have the so-called subinterval 
property (Bennett and Partee 1972, Dowty 1979). 
{j I will discuss the problem associated with repeated occurrences of before -clause 
events in Section 3 .  
7 If we adopt the truth conditions given in ( 10), then a question immediately arises 
as to how the observed difference between factual and non-factual cases should be 
accounted for. This topic will be discussed in sections 3 through 5. 
8 See Sanchez Valencia et al. ( 1 994) for the relation between veridicality and 
downward-entailingness. 
9 uti literally means 'inside' or 'within' .  
1 0  This i s  based upon a sequence-of-tense analysis of  tense morphemes in 
embedded structures. In this particular case, the past tense morpheme in the 
before-clause is analyzed as semantically empty. See Ogihara (in press). 
1 1  I use this term only for expository purposes. It is due to Heim (1982). 
12 Johnston ( 1994) criticizes Rooth's theory of focus regarding temporal adverbial 
clauses. I acquired a copy of this work when I was completing this paper and 
hence cannot respond to it in this paper because of time constraints. 
1 3 See example (30). 
289 
290 Toshiyuki Ogihara 
1 4  The context set can be derived by the following operation: u{p I p is a 
proposition that is taken for granted by the participants of the conversation } .  p is 
presupposed in context c iff p is true in every world in the context set. 
15 I thank Ikumi Imani (personal communication) for calling my attention to 
topicalized mae-ni ( 'before' )-clauses in Japanese. 
I ONote that (i) is perfectly acceptable. 
(i) Taroo-wa Kyoto-ni kuru mae( -ni)-wa Tokyo-ni sundei-ta. 
Taro-TOP Kyoto-DAT come-PRFS before-TOP TOKYO-at live-PAST 
'Taro lived in Tokyo before he came to Kyoto.' 
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